Causal model
What has to happen for this consequence to hold?
1 candidate path · explicit source, inference, and assumption boundaries.
Privacy · Dominant path
Data privacy
Extracted firmware exposes proprietary device logic and operational control data rather than ordinary personal information.
Reusable artifact or reachable service
An attacker can obtain the firmware files through their own copy of the companion app or update flow; no access to a victim device is required.
EvidenceNVD
One cross-boundary bridge
Enables further reverse engineering across app and firmware boundary but is not a multi-hop reusable authority bridge by itself.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Sensitive device or personal data
Extracted firmware exposes proprietary device logic and operational control data rather than ordinary personal information.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Data privacy
Extracted firmware exposes proprietary device logic and operational control data rather than ordinary personal information.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Routine local recovery
Low recovery burden (no key rotation or recall needed for the extraction itself).
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Decision rationale
Why this band?
The compact score is separated into the facts and judgments that produced it.
Reach and effort
- Reachability
RE 3 - Reusable artifact or reachable service
An attacker can obtain the firmware files through their own copy of the companion app or update flow; no access to a victim device is required.
- Execution complexity
EC 4 - Straightforward operation
Straightforward extraction, single operation.
- Exposure
EX 3 - Access position limits exposure
The technique is easier to perform than it is to position against a target, so access is the constraining factor.
Consequence
- Physical / safety
PH 0 - No direct physical effect
No direct safety effect from mere extraction.
- Data / perception
DP 3 - Sensitive device or personal data
Extracted firmware exposes proprietary device logic and operational control data rather than ordinary personal information.
- Authority
AT 1 - Read-only or preparatory access
No direct authority gained.
Scale and recovery
- Chainability
CH 2 - One cross-boundary bridge
Enables further reverse engineering across app and firmware boundary but is not a multi-hop reusable authority bridge by itself.
- Reuse scale
SR 3 - Portable product-class technique
The extracted artifact is portable across devices that share the same firmware image.
- Execution scale
SX 3 - Deployment-wide with setup
Deployment-wide once the technique is set up, but each victim's data is not remotely harvested - it is the common firmware that is exposed.
- Recovery burden
OR 1 - Routine local recovery
Low recovery burden (no key rotation or recall needed for the extraction itself).
Confidence and status
- Evidence strength
EV 2 - Public report, not reproduced here
NVD reports the condition, but this registry has not independently reproduced this path.
- Liveness
LS Historical - Historical condition
The condition is retained as a historical case rather than a claim of current field exposure.
Decision trail
How the final band follows
- Base bandHIGH
- No adjustment
The HIGH base band remains final because no separate cap or systemic uplift applies. Extracted firmware exposes proprietary device logic and operational control data rather than ordinary personal information.
- Final candidate bandHIGH
Technical vector
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:DATA_PRIVACY/RE:3/EC:4/EX:3/PH:0/DP:3/AT:1/CH:2/SR:3/SX:3/OR:1/EV:2/LS:HISTORICALRead the scoring method →Triage implication
Verify the privacy transition before acting on the band.
Protect the outward data or sensor boundary and verify what sensitive behavior can be reconstructed, not only what raw fields are exposed.
Evidence ledger
Public sources used by this record.
Every named source includes a public link. Path review remains separate from citation coverage.
- advisoryNVD
NVD
Published baseline
Keep exploit severity and consequence reasoning distinct.
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:XCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:LCVE recordsCVE-2025-23421
Original scorer notes
The source narrative behind the structured explanation.
Retained for provenance and historical review, not as the recommended way to understand the assessment.
Read the original scorer notes
Assessment
CFSE Consequence Paths assesses Qardio firmware files extractable at HIGH — the worst of 1 risk path (perception). The dominant consequence is exposure of sensitive data.
Vulnerability
Qardio firmware files extractable. Reported attack vector: Physical (disputed).
CFSE Consequence Paths analysis
The vulnerability is decomposed into one risk path per terminal consequence. Each path is scored on its exposure (reachability × execution complexity) and the authority, perception, and physical/safety it reaches, together with its scale of reuse, scale of execution, and recoverability.
DATA_PRIVACY → HIGH
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:DATA_PRIVACY/RE:3/EC:4/EX:3/PH:0/DP:3/AT:1/CH:2/SR:3/SX:3/OR:1/EV:2/LS:HISTORICAL
Exposure EX=3 (reachability-bound) · bands PH=ELEVATED · DP=HIGH · AT=HIGH → base HIGH · caps privacy-only cap → assessed HIGH.
- Mobile apps allow unauthorized access to firmware update files. RE:3 because the attacker uses their own app artifact/OTA flow (attacker-owned), not victim physical hardware despite the disputed Physical AV label - reading app-accessible firmware files is the app-artifact case. EC:4 straightforward extraction, single operation. AT:1 no direct authority gained; firmware extraction is read-only and only enables downstream RE (no signing key or fleet control exposed). PH:0 no direct safety effect from mere extraction. DP:3 firmware/proprietary control data (sensitive operational/firmware data, not just PII). CH:2 enables further reverse engineering across app/firmware boundary but is not a multi-hop reusable authority bridge by itself;
- boundary_crossing — true (app -> firmware/device domain). SR:3 same firmware image is shared across the fleet so the extracted artifact is portable. SX:3 deployment-wide once the technique is set up, but each victim’s data is not remotely harvested - it is the common firmware that is exposed. OR:1 low recovery burden (no key rotation or recall needed for the extraction itself). EV:2 report-backed (CVE-2025-23421). LS HISTORICAL. AT held at 1 - no demonstrated trust-root or control-safety consequence; only firmware confidentiality.
Published baseline
- v4.0 6.9 MEDIUM —
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X— CISA/ICS-CERT via NVD - v3.1 6.4 MEDIUM —
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L— CISA/ICS-CERT via NVD
The published baseline above is retained for source review. The registry records the reachable consequence path, including deployment-specific cyber-physical consequence, physical/safety impact, scale, and recovery burden.
Sources
CFSE Consequence Paths Registry 1.0-candidate, CPATH-2026-0008 (“Qardio firmware files extractable”), paths.cfse.ai/CPATH-2026-0008 (published 2026-06-03).