Causal model
What has to happen for this consequence to hold?
3 candidate paths · explicit source, inference, and assumption boundaries.
Systemic · Dominant path
Fleet control plane
A compromised robot can scan for in-range peers and reuse the shared key, turning local root entry into repeatable deployment propagation.
Repeatable root across peers
Automated peer scanning removes the need for the attacker to approach every robot personally, so the model assigns fleet-scale reuse and execution to an in-range deployment.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Fleet control plane
Repeated root compromise can aggregate control, sensing access, and safety exposure across multiple mobile robots. EMERGENCY denotes that reachable deployment consequence, not confirmed exploitation in the field.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Fleet-wide remediation
Recovery requires fleet-wide firmware remediation and coordinated verification because any unpatched peer left in range can preserve the propagation condition.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Decision rationale
Why this band?
The compact score is separated into the facts and judgments that produced it.
Reach and effort
- Reachability
RE 2 - Proximity or local access
One robot must first be reached over BLE; an infected robot can then scan for nearby peers and reuse the shared key without further attacker proximity.
- Execution complexity
EC 4 - Straightforward operation
The published proof of concept automates peer discovery and reuse of the shared key after the first robot is compromised.
- Exposure
EX 2 - Access position limits exposure
Initial access remains limited to BLE range even though an infected robot can automate propagation to nearby peers.
Consequence
- Physical / safety
PH 3 - Credible safety consequence
Aggregate of many root-controlled mobile robots reduces safety margin across a deployment.
- Data / perception
DP 3 - Sensitive device or personal data
Operational or firmware state across fleet.
- Authority
AT 3 - Administrative or command authority
Root authority on each peer (not firmware-update or signing-root).
Scale and recovery
- Chainability
CH 4 - Cross-domain authority chain
Multi-hop reusable cross-domain bridge.
- Reuse scale
SR 4 - Shared fleet-wide primitive
(shared key across entire population).
- Execution scale
SX 4 - Remote fleet-scale execution
After one nearby robot is compromised, automated scanning and the shared key let it approach additional in-range peers without the attacker visiting each one.
- Recovery burden
OR 4 - Fleet action or replacement
Every affected robot needs patched firmware and coordinated verification because one unpatched peer can preserve the nearby propagation path.
Confidence and status
- Evidence strength
EV 3 - Reproduced or strongly report-backed
NVD supports a reproduced or strongly report-backed condition; this registry still keeps consequence review separate from exploit confirmation.
- Liveness
LS Active - Active condition at scoring time
The public record did not establish a complete mitigation at scoring time; field exploitation is stated only where a cited source supports it. This status is recorded for Unitree UniPwn.
Decision trail
How the final band follows
- Base bandCRITICAL
- Systemic uplift
The CRITICAL base band rises to EMERGENCY because a compromised robot can scan for peers and reuse the shared key, while recovery must cover every reachable robot in the deployment.
- Final candidate bandEMERGENCY
Technical vector
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:FLEET_CONTROL_PLANE/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:3/DP:3/AT:3/CH:4/SR:4/SX:4/OR:4/EV:3/LS:ACTIVERead the scoring method →Perception · Supporting path
Perception-to-action
BLE-proximity root authority reaches the perception and motion stack of a mobile robot, creating a modeled embodied-safety path.
Root reaches the embodied stack
Root authority can reach onboard perception inputs and the motion stack; that is the modeled transition from device compromise to perception-informed actuation.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Mobile-robot safety consequence
Unauthorized control of the motion stack on a walking mobile robot can create physical or bystander safety consequences. This is a capability-grounded candidate path; the sources do not establish weaponized motion or field harm.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Per-unit embodied recovery
This path assumes BLE proximity for initial actuation control and vendor firmware remediation with per-unit verification; it does not inherit fleet propagation automatically.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Decision rationale
Why this band?
The compact score is separated into the facts and judgments that produced it.
Reach and effort
- Reachability
RE 2 - Proximity or local access
The initial attacker must be within BLE range; the shared key and weak authentication then expose the root command path without a prior account.
- Execution complexity
EC 4 - Straightforward operation
The published proof of concept combines the shared BLE key, weak string authentication, and command injection into a reproducible root workflow.
- Exposure
EX 2 - Access position limits exposure
The root workflow is reproducible, but the attacker still has to begin within BLE range of an affected robot.
Consequence
- Physical / safety
PH 4 - Severe therapy or actuation consequence
A compromised robot can issue motion commands to peers, creating a credible risk of collision or unsafe movement around people.
- Data / perception
DP 4 - Safety-driving perception or intimate data
Onboard perception (LIDAR or spatial map or camera) drives the robot's own actuation, so perception feeds action (the perception-to-action link).
- Authority
AT 3 - Administrative or command authority
The reused fleet key grants command authority over reachable robots without exposing the vendor’s firmware-signing root.
Scale and recovery
- Chainability
CH 4 - Cross-domain authority chain
Crosses RF to device to physical or safety boundaries.
- Reuse scale
SR 4 - Shared fleet-wide primitive
Shared key reuses across population.
- Execution scale
SX 2 - Proximity-bound repetition
Initial motion control remains limited to one robot within BLE range; automated peer propagation is assessed in the separate fleet path.
- Recovery burden
OR 3 - Coordinated operational recovery
Vendor firmware fix needed but per-unit, not a recall or signing-root rotation.
Confidence and status
- Evidence strength
EV 3 - Reproduced or strongly report-backed
NVD supports a reproduced or strongly report-backed condition; this registry still keeps consequence review separate from exploit confirmation.
- Liveness
LS Active - Active condition at scoring time
The public record did not establish a complete mitigation at scoring time; field exploitation is stated only where a cited source supports it. This status is recorded for Unitree UniPwn.
Decision trail
How the final band follows
- Base bandCRITICAL
- No adjustment
The CRITICAL base band remains final because no separate cap or systemic uplift applies. Onboard perception (LIDAR or spatial map or camera) drives the robot's own actuation, so perception feeds action (the perception-to-action link).
- Final candidate bandCRITICAL
Technical vector
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:PERCEPTION_TO_ACTION/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:4/DP:4/AT:3/CH:4/SR:4/SX:2/OR:3/EV:3/LS:ACTIVERead the scoring method →Privacy · Supporting path
Perception privacy
Root access exposes live camera and microphone streams, LIDAR output, and spatial maps that describe the robot's surroundings.
Proximity or local access
The attacker first obtains root from within BLE range using the same shared-key weakness as the motion-control path.
EvidenceNVD
Reusable multi-stage bridge
BLE entry crosses into the robot operating system and then into live sensing and stored spatial state.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Safety-driving perception or intimate data
Root access exposes live camera and microphone streams, LIDAR output, and spatial maps that describe the robot's surroundings.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Perception privacy
Root access exposes live camera and microphone streams, LIDAR output, and spatial maps that describe the robot's surroundings.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Coordinated operational recovery
Affected robots need the vendor firmware fix and per-unit verification that the shared-key entry path is closed.
EvidenceNo direct citation — inspect the declared inference or assumption.
Decision rationale
Why this band?
The compact score is separated into the facts and judgments that produced it.
Reach and effort
- Reachability
RE 2 - Proximity or local access
The attacker first obtains root from within BLE range using the same shared-key weakness as the motion-control path.
- Execution complexity
EC 4 - Straightforward operation
The published root workflow already exposes the robot operating system; opening camera, microphone, LIDAR, or map data requires no separate exploit.
- Exposure
EX 2 - Access position limits exposure
The technique is easier to perform than it is to position against a target, so access is the constraining factor.
Consequence
- Physical / safety
PH 0 - No direct physical effect
This privacy path concerns surveillance through robot sensors; any physical hazard from root-controlled motion is assessed in the separate safety path.
- Data / perception
DP 4 - Safety-driving perception or intimate data
Root access exposes live camera and microphone streams, LIDAR output, and spatial maps that describe the robot's surroundings.
- Authority
AT 3 - Administrative or command authority
The attacker holds operating-system root while collecting sensor data; the path does not claim control of a vendor signing key.
Scale and recovery
- Chainability
CH 3 - Reusable multi-stage bridge
BLE entry crosses into the robot operating system and then into live sensing and stored spatial state.
- Reuse scale
SR 4 - Shared fleet-wide primitive
The shared BLE key and root workflow can be reused across affected robot models.
- Execution scale
SX 2 - Proximity-bound repetition
Sensor collection is available on each compromised robot, while initial access to this path remains proximity-bound.
- Recovery burden
OR 3 - Coordinated operational recovery
Affected robots need the vendor firmware fix and per-unit verification that the shared-key entry path is closed.
Confidence and status
- Evidence strength
EV 3 - Reproduced or strongly report-backed
NVD supports a reproduced or strongly report-backed condition; this registry still keeps consequence review separate from exploit confirmation.
- Liveness
LS Active - Active condition at scoring time
The public record did not establish a complete mitigation at scoring time; field exploitation is stated only where a cited source supports it.
Decision trail
How the final band follows
- Base bandCRITICAL
- No adjustment
The CRITICAL base band remains final because no separate cap or systemic uplift applies. Root access exposes live camera and microphone streams, LIDAR output, and spatial maps that describe the robot's surroundings.
- Final candidate bandCRITICAL
Technical vector
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:PERCEPTION_PRIVACY/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:0/DP:4/AT:3/CH:3/SR:4/SX:2/OR:3/EV:3/LS:ACTIVERead the scoring method →Triage implication
Verify the systemic transition before acting on the band.
Triage beyond the first device: verify whether the reusable condition, propagation mechanism, and recovery dependency actually exist across the deployment.
Evidence ledger
Public sources used by this record.
Every named source includes a public link. Path review remains separate from citation coverage.
Published baseline
Keep exploit severity and consequence reasoning distinct.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:HCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:LCVE recordsCVE-2025-35027CVE-2025-60017CVE-2025-60250CVE-2025-60251
Original scorer notes
The source narrative behind the structured explanation.
Retained for provenance and historical review, not as the recommended way to understand the assessment.
Read the original scorer notes
Assessment
CFSE Consequence Paths assesses Unitree UniPwn — BLE Wi-Fi config root takeover (Go2/B2/G1/H1) at EMERGENCY — the worst of 3 risk paths (perception, authority). The dominant consequence is reach into a fleet management plane.
Vulnerability
Unitree UniPwn — BLE Wi-Fi config root takeover (Go2/B2/G1/H1). Reported attack vector: Adjacent (Bluetooth/BLE proximity).
CFSE Consequence Paths analysis
The vulnerability is decomposed into one risk path per terminal consequence. Each path is scored on its exposure (reachability × execution complexity) and the authority, perception, and physical/safety it reaches, together with its scale of reuse, scale of execution, and recoverability.
PERCEPTION_TO_ACTION → CRITICAL
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:PERCEPTION_TO_ACTION/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:4/DP:4/AT:3/CH:4/SR:4/SX:2/OR:3/EV:3/LS:ACTIVE
Exposure EX=2 (reachability-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=CRITICAL · AT=HIGH → base CRITICAL → assessed CRITICAL.
- BLE-proximity (RE2) unauthenticated root via hardcoded key + trivial string-auth + sudo command injection (EC4, public PoC). Root grants full control of the motion stack of a walking humanoid/quadruped: credible physical hazard to bystanders (PH4). Onboard perception (LIDAR/spatial map/camera) drives the robot’s own actuation, so perception feeds action (DP4, perception_feeds_action).
- AT3 — full OS/service authority but not a signing-root/OTA-root. Crosses RF->device->physical/safety boundaries (CH4, boundary_crossing).
- SR4 — shared key reuses across population;
- SX2 — per-device proximity for the initial actuation control.
- OR3 — vendor firmware fix needed but per-unit, not a recall/signing-root rotation.
- EV3 — reproduced; no published weaponized-motion demo so active_exploitation=false.
FLEET_CONTROL_PLANE → EMERGENCY
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:FLEET_CONTROL_PLANE/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:4/DP:3/AT:3/CH:4/SR:4/SX:4/OR:4/EV:3/LS:ACTIVE
Exposure EX=2 (reachability-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=HIGH · AT=HIGH → base CRITICAL · uplift fleet-reachable authority, recall-class recovery → assessed EMERGENCY.
- Wormable: a compromised robot autonomously scans BLE and infects in-range Unitree units using the same hardcoded shared key, forming a robot botnet. Initial entry is BLE-proximity (RE2) but propagation is self-spreading and key-portable, so SX4 (fleet/deployment-scale propagation without per-device human access by the attacker), SR4 (shared key across entire population).
- EC4 — wormable automation in PoC.
- AT3 — root authority on each peer (not OTA/signing-root).
- PH3 — aggregate of many root-controlled mobile robots reduces safety margin across a deployment.
- DP3 — operational/firmware state across fleet.
- CH4 — multi-hop reusable cross-domain bridge;
- boundary_crossing — true.
- OR4 — recovery needs fleet-wide firmware remediation and re-infection trivial while any unpatched peer remains in range (recovery_needs_fleet_action).
- EV3 — reproduced; worm demonstrated in research but not confirmed exploited in wild, so active_exploitation=false.
PERCEPTION_PRIVACY → CRITICAL
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:PERCEPTION_PRIVACY/RE:2/EC:4/EX:2/PH:4/DP:4/AT:3/CH:3/SR:4/SX:2/OR:3/EV:3/LS:ACTIVE
Exposure EX=2 (reachability-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=CRITICAL · AT=HIGH → base CRITICAL · caps privacy-only cap → assessed CRITICAL.
- Same BLE-proximity root (RE2, EC4, AT3). Root grants live access to cameras, microphones, LIDAR and spatial maps for surveillance/exfiltration: DP4 (live-camera/spatial-map/world-model state). Here the perception is exfiltrated for surveillance, not feeding the robot’s own safety-relevant action, so perception_feeds_action=false.
- CH3 — (RF->device->cloud/exfil bridge);
- boundary_crossing — true.
- SR4 — shared key;
- SX2 — per-device proximity.
- OR3 — firmware fix per unit.
- EV3 — reproduced.
Published baseline
- v3.1 7.3 HIGH —
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N— Takeonme CNA via NVD (CVE-2025-35027) - v3.1 8.2 HIGH —
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H— MITRE via NVD (CVE-2025-60017) - v3.1 4.7 MEDIUM —
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N— MITRE via NVD (CVE-2025-60250) - v3.1 5 MEDIUM —
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L— MITRE via NVD (CVE-2025-60251)
The published baseline above is retained for source review. The registry records the reachable consequence path, including deployment-specific cyber-physical consequence, physical/safety impact, scale, and recovery burden.
Sources
CFSE Consequence Paths Registry 1.0-candidate, CPATH-2026-0023 (“Unitree UniPwn — BLE Wi-Fi config root takeover (Go2/B2/G1/H1)”), paths.cfse.ai/CPATH-2026-0023 (published 2026-06-03).