Assessment
CFSE Consequence Paths assesses Teleoperated surgical robot (Raven II) command hijacking & E-stop abuse at CRITICAL — the worst of 3 risk paths (perception, safety). The dominant consequence is manipulated perception that drives action.
Vulnerability
Teleoperated surgical robot (Raven II) command hijacking & E-stop abuse. Reported attack vector: Network (man-in-the-middle on teleoperation link).
CFSE Consequence Paths analysis
The vulnerability is decomposed into one risk path per terminal consequence. Each path is scored on its exposure (reachability × execution complexity) and the authority, perception, and physical/safety it reaches, together with its scale of reuse, scale of execution, and recoverability.
PERCEPTION_TO_ACTION → CRITICAL
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:PERCEPTION_TO_ACTION/RE:2/EC:2/EX:2/PH:4/DP:4/AT:3/CH:3/SR:3/SX:2/OR:2/EV:3/LS:HISTORICAL
Exposure EX=2 (reachability and complexity-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=CRITICAL · AT=HIGH → base CRITICAL → assessed CRITICAL.
- Intention-modification: MITM on the unauthenticated/unencrypted teleoperation link lets the attacker read and alter the command/feedback stream so the corrupted perception loop between surgeon and robot drives unintended actuation.
- RE2 — (network MITM position on the control path; demonstrated on public/shared networks, not internet-default and not victim physical).
- EC2 — advanced-but-reproducible MITM, but trivial once positioned.
- AT3 — control-channel/command authority over robot, not OS root or signing root.
- PH4 — and DP4 because the manipulated feedback/command state is safety-relevant world/control state on a patient-manipulating robot;
- perception_feeds_action — true.
- CH3 — crosses console/network/device/physical/safety boundaries.
- SR3 — protocol-level weakness reuses across deployments using the same unprotected protocol but is not a shared key/artifact.
- SX2 — per-link/per-deployment proximity, no fleet mechanism.
- EV3 — reproduced (DSN 2015).
DEVICE_CONTROL_SAFETY → CRITICAL
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:DEVICE_CONTROL_SAFETY/RE:2/EC:2/EX:2/PH:4/DP:3/AT:3/CH:3/SR:3/SX:2/OR:2/EV:3/LS:HISTORICAL
Exposure EX=2 (reachability and complexity-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=HIGH · AT=HIGH → base CRITICAL → assessed CRITICAL.
- Full hijacking: attacker gains effective control authority over robot motion without credentials, overriding/ignoring operator inputs to drive dangerous actuation against a patient.
- RE2 — network MITM position.
- EC2 — reproducible MITM, simple injection once positioned.
- AT3 — control/command authority (no root-of-trust or signing key compromised).
- PH4 — credible patient injury from unintended/maliciously commanded motion;
- perception_feeds_action — true since the hijacked command stream directly causes safety-relevant physical action.
- DP3 — control/command state.
- CH3 — and boundary_crossing across network/device/physical/safety.
- SR3 — protocol-class reuse.
- SX2 — per-link, no demonstrated fleet execution.
- OR2 — recovery is operational (regain link, abort).
- EV3 — reproduced.
DEVICE_AVAILABILITY → CRITICAL
CPATH:1.0-candidate/TT:DEVICE_AVAILABILITY/RE:2/EC:3/EX:2/PH:4/DP:1/AT:2/CH:2/SR:3/SX:2/OR:2/EV:3/LS:HISTORICAL
Exposure EX=2 (reachability-bound) · bands PH=CRITICAL · DP=ELEVATED · AT=ELEVATED → base CRITICAL → assessed CRITICAL.
- E-stop abuse: a single unauthenticated packet triggers the robot’s own emergency-stop to deny operation mid-procedure.
- RE2 — network MITM/on-path position.
- EC3 — standard once positioned but notably efficient (single packet); not EC4 because it still needs an on-path/injection position.
- AT2 — abuse of a bounded safety/availability control rather than full command authority.
- PH3 — safety-margin reduction: aborting/halting mid-procedure is disruptive and can reduce safety margin but is the platform’s fail-safe rather than dangerous actuation, so not PH4.
- DP1 — negligible data impact.
- CH2 — crosses network/device/safety boundary, limited chainability.
- SR3 — protocol-class reuse.
- SX2 — per-link.
- OR2 — operational recovery (regain link, abort/restart).
- EV3 — reproduced.
Published baseline
No public baseline score has been published for this finding. It belongs to a perception/control harm class that is often outside published vulnerability-scoring coverage. The registry records the reachable consequence path for review.
Sources
- source citation pending public URL